fix: harden web runtime and follow-up auth/db security fixes (#21)

## Summary
- harden the web runtime with JSON body limits, stricter generation input validation, rate limiting, and trusted Origin/Referer checks for cookie-authenticated mutations
- redact password-reset tokens from debug email transport logs and fail closed for unsupported email providers
- scope generation idempotency keys per user with a Prisma migration and regression coverage

## Testing
- docker build -f infra/docker/web.Dockerfile -t nroxy-web-check .
- docker run --rm --entrypoint sh nroxy-web-check -lc "pnpm --filter @nproxy/providers test && pnpm --filter @nproxy/db test && pnpm --filter @nproxy/web test"

Closes #14
Closes #7
Closes #8

Co-authored-by: sirily <sirily@git.shararam.party>
Reviewed-on: #21
This commit was merged in pull request #21.
This commit is contained in:
2026-03-11 16:28:56 +03:00
parent 9641678fa3
commit 1a7250467e
14 changed files with 924 additions and 202 deletions

View File

@@ -32,3 +32,8 @@
- User-caused provider failures are terminal for that request.
- Balance or quota exhaustion removes a key from active rotation.
- Provider-key state transitions must be audited.
## Web session posture
- Browser sessions use `Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict` cookies.
- State-changing cookie-authenticated endpoints accept requests only from the configured app/admin origins and require browser `Origin` or `Referer` metadata.
- The current API posture assumes a same-origin browser client. If cross-site embeds or third-party POST flows are introduced later, add an explicit CSRF token mechanism instead of relaxing the cookie/origin checks.